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I. Introduction
Every nation has the right to define the laws within its borders.1
I See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (recognizing the di-
verse positions held by imperialistic and communistic countries on the issue of expropria-
tion); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 441
(1987) (foreign compulsion) (explaining that governments have the right to compel foreign
citizens to abide by their laws while in their territory); cf. Jonathan M. Wight, An Evaluation of
the Commercial Activities Exception to the Act of State Doctrine, 19 DAYTON L. REv. 1265, 1280-83
(1994) (explaining that a nation's sovereignty is no longer afforded the absolute deference
enjoyed in the past).
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Furthermore, foreign sovereigns are afforded great deference in the
interpretation of their laws.2 In some manner, every public act by a
foreign sovereign is an interpretation of its own law.3 As such, these
acts should be presumed valid.4 When a U.S. court challenges the va-
lidity of one of these acts, the foreign sovereign is likely to be offended
to some degree, and the relations between the United States and the
foreign sovereign are likely to suffer.5
To prevent unwarranted interference with foreign policy, U.S.
courts have adopted the act of state doctrine. 6 In short, this doctrine
precludes inquiry into the validity of a foreign sovereign's actions if
such an inquiry is likely to hinder or embarrass the executive branch's
foreign policy.7 The act of state doctrine was founded originally upon
the principles of comity and international law.8 However, in 1964, the
Supreme Court fundamentally altered the doctrine by shifting its justi-
fication to a separation of powers theory.9 Since that time the doctrine
has come under constant attack 10 and as a result, it has become much
weaker.1I The recent case of Grupo Protexa, S.A. v. All American Marine
2 Spencer W. Waller, A Unified Theory of Transnational Procedure, 26 CORNELL INT'L LJ.
101, 124 (stating that U.S. courts are bound by a foreign sovereign's interpretation of its own
legal pronouncements).
3 See Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1432 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 497 U.S. 1058
(1989) (stating that courts must be cautious not to affront a foreign government's
sovereignty).
4 Waller, supra note 2, at 124.
5 Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 325, 367
(1986); see also Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521 (2d
Cir.) (explaining that it would be an affront to a foreign sovereign for a U.S. court to find the
sovereign's expropriation invalid), cert. dismissed, 47 U.S. 934 (1985).
6 Allied Bank Int'4 757 F.2d at 520.
7 Id.
8 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 417 (1964).
9 Id. at 423.
10 Bazyler, supra note 5, at 397 (arguing that the act of state doctrine should be aban-
doned and that other more reasoned doctrines should be used in its place); Gregory H. Fox,
Reexamining the Act of State Doctrine: An Integrated Conflicts Analysis, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 521,
568 (1992) (concluding that the act of state doctrine should be rejected because its current
application has lost touch with its roots of comity and international law); seeWight, supra note
1, at 1287 (noting that because substantial codification of international law has occurred in
recent years, inquiries into the validity of foreign sovereign acts are less likely to embarrass
the executive branch). But see id. at 1302 (even though support for the act of state doctrine
has weakened, not all commercial activity of a foreign sovereign should be subject to
scrutiny).
I See Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528, 1531 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that the act
of state doctrine is no longer widely applied, that the doctrine has earned a "well-deserved
rest," and that the Supreme Court now applies a restrictive attitude toward the doctrine); see
infra notes 112-73 and accompanying text (illustrating the Supreme Court's continuous-re-
strictions and limitations on the doctrine); cf. Bazyler, supra note 5, at 398 (arguing that the
doctrine should be abandoned because the courts have severely confused its application); see
generally, Bernard Ilkhanoff, Comment, United States v. Noriega: The Act of State Doctrine and the
Relationship Between the Judiciary and the Executive, 7 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 345 (1993) (sug-
gesting that the courts should create yet another act of state doctrine exception for an ex-
press executive request).
[VOL. 20
DECLINE OF THE AcT OF STATE DOCTRINE
Slip (Protexa I1)12 illustrates this weakness as well as several underlying
practices which have led to the doctrine's decline.
This Note will examine how Protexa II illustrates the current weak-
ness in the act of state doctrine and the effect thar this decline has on
the resulting judgments. In Part II, the Note will discuss the Third
Circuit's disposition of the case. 13 Part III discusses the background of
the act of state doctrine as it has progressed from the beginning of the
century through its fundamental shift in the 1960s and finally to its
current treatment during the last decade.1 4 Part IV will discuss several
inconsistent analytical approaches illustrated by the Protexa II opinion,
the appropriateness of the resulting judgment, and finally the logic of
Protexa ITs extension of the doctrine. 15 In conclusion, this Note will
suggest that the doctrine has been weakened to the point that it no
longer serves any significant purpose and that the courts should con-
sider abandoning the doctrine as a prudential rule of decision.' 6
II. Statement of the Case
On December 15, 1985, Grupo Protexa's ship, the HUICHOL II,
sank forty-five miles east of Mexico during a violent storm in the Bay of
Campeche.17 The ship was a diving support vessel performing con-
struction work for the Mexican national oil company, Pemex.18 It sank
in roughly 100 feet of water, 1.5 miles from the Pemex oil exploratory
zone, and three miles from the nearest oil platform.1 9 The interna-
tional community recognizes this area as Mexico's Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ).20
Pursuant to a standard clause in a multilayered policy,2' Grupo
Protexa was insured for removal costs of the wreck if the removal was
"compulsory-by-law. ' 22 Two days after the ship sank, the Port Cap-
tain 23 for Ciudad del Carmen issued a written order that, according to
12 20 F.3d 1224 (3d Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Protexa II].
13 See infra notes 17-55 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 55-173 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 174-275 and accompanying text.
16 See infra part V.
17 Protexa II, supra note 12, 20 F.3d 1224, 1226 (3d Cir. 1994).
18 Id.; Grupo Protexa, S.A. v. All Am. Marine Slip, 753 F. Supp. 1217, 1219 (D.N.J.
1990), rev'd, 954 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Protexa I].
19 Grupo Protexa, 753 F. Supp. at 1218. More than 27 seamen died in the sinking.
Protexa I, supra note 18, 954 F.2d at 132.
20 Protexa II, supra note 12, 20 F.3d at 1226.
21 The insurance policy underwriting was split into multiple coverage levels. First, a
Mexican insurance company was responsible for 5% of all losses. Next, four primary layer
underwriters were responsible for 95% of the first $2.5 million. Then, three excess layer
underwriters were responsible for 95% of losses exceeding that $2.5 million per the following
percentages: AAMS, 30%; Lloyds/London, 65%; and CIGNA/AFIA, 5%. Id.
22 Id.
23 The Port Captain is the government official with authority to "perform police func-
tions within his jurisdiction pertaining to health, sanitation and customs." Id. at 1240. His
jurisdiction is defined by the president, id., and he is responsible for all matters of the Mari-
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the English translation, required Grupo Protexa to post a bond "guar-
antee[ing] the cleaning up of the area and the salvaging of [the] ves-
sel."24 Grupo Protexa and its insurance broker interpreted the order
as requiring immediate removal of the wreck.2 5 The broker then con-
tacted the various underwriters to discuss the order and the proposed
removal plan to which all but two of the underwriters agreed.2 6 The
defendant underwriter, All American Marine Slip (AAMS), simply ad-
vised Grupo Protexa to take all necessary steps to minimize the loss. 2 7
Realizing that the Port Captain's authority might be contested,
Grupo Protexa sent an in-house attorney to Carmen to review the or-
der.2 8 After determining that the order was in fact valid, the attorney
visited the Port Captain in an attempt to obtain a suspension or rescis-
sion.2 9 The Port Captain informed the attorney that such relief would
have to be sought from officials in Mexico City and that he expected
the removal efforts to commence without delay.3 0 Otherwise, the navy
would take over, and Protexa would be punished to the full extent of
the law.3 1 After the attorney identified five potential consequences for
noncompliance,3 2 Grupo Protexa decided not to challenge the order
and proceeded with the removal.3 3 Total costs for the removal ex-
ceeded $12 million of which AAMS was responsible for over $2.8 mil-
lion.3 4 On the grounds that the Port Captain's order did not qualify as
"compulsory-by-law," AAMS refused to pay.3 5
This appeal was the second time the Third Circuit had heard the
time Authority which occur within his jurisdiction. Protexa I, supra note 18, 753 F. Supp.
1217, 1224 (D.N.J. 1990), rev'd, 954 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1992). By comparison with U.S. law,
the court ruled that the Port Captain's authority to order the removal of the ship depended
on the existence of enabling legislation. Protexa II, supra note 12, 20 F.3d at 1240-41 n.26
(observing that the Mexican Constitution prohibits the interference with a citizen's posses-
sions unless a competent authority gives written notice indicating the legal basis and reasons
for the proceeding). The essence of the court's disposition was that no enabling legislation
provided such authority. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
24 Protexa II, supra note 12, 20 F.3d at 1227.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1228.
30 Id.
31 Id. Neither the Port Captain nor the parties elaborated on what charges or penalties
might have been pursued. Id. However, Grupo Protexa's attorney identified five potential
consequences of noncompliance, including forfeiture of $50,000 in bonds and indemnity
actions for the navy's costs of removing the vessel. Id. at 1228, 1234 n.14. The other conse-
quences identified included: 1) Mexico could remove the ship and then bill Protexa for the
costs; 2) catastrophic liability to third parties should damage result from the movement of
the wreck; 3) noncompliance sanctions; 4) forfeiture of the vessel and bond; and 5) loss of
goodwill with the Mexican government. Id.
32 See supra note 31.
33 Protexa II, supra note 12, 20 F.3d at 1228,,1234 n.14.
34 Id.
35 Id.
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case. In Grupo Protexa, S.A. v. All American Marine Slip,36 the court re-
jected the trial judge's interpretation of insurance law and held that
the Port Captain's order made the removal "compulsory-by-law" if the
order was in fact valid under Mexican law.3 7 The court also held that a
mere literal translation of the order was insufficient to determine its
meaning.3 8 In remanding the case, the court directed the trial judge
to examine the validity of the order as well as the applicability of the
act of state doctrine.3 9 If the act of state doctrine precluded review of
the order's validity, the order would be presumed valid, and Grupo
Protexa would win its suit.
At the second bench trial, the trialjudge held that "the act of state
doctrine did not bar an inquiry" into the order's validity.40 The trial
judge determined that "the policies underlying the doctrine were not
implicated in this case and that for reasons of 'fair play and fundamen-
tal justice,' " Grupo Protexa should not be allowed to use the doctrine
as a sword.41 The judge then received additional evidence including
expert testimony concerning the order's validity under Mexican and
international law.4 2 He found the order invalid and held in favor of
the AAMS.4 3 Grupo Protexa appealed.
In Protexa II, the Third Circuit reaffirmed its earlier interpretation
of the insurance law. 4 4 Since no Mexican statute or regulation required
the removal, the court held that Grupo Protexa could show the re-
moval was "compulsory-by-law" only if Grupo Protexa showed the Port
Captain's order itself was valid.45 The court then considered whether
the act of state doctrine required the court to presume the order's
validity.
After discussing the act of state doctrine's history, the court identi-
fied several of its tenets. First, the doctrine arises only when a court
must decide the effect of a foreign sovereign's actions.46 Next, the
doctrine's application depends on the judicial inquiry's likely impact
36 Protexa I, supra note 18, 954 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1992).
37 Id. at 138.
38 Id.
39 Protexa II, supra note 12, 20 F.3d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1994).
40 Id. at 1225. The second bench trial was unreported.
41 Id. at 1230.
42 Id. at 1225.
43 Id. at 1226.
44 Id. at 1231-35 (the court again extensively reexamined the development of the com-
pulsory-by-law standard as applied by the various circuits).
45 Id. at 1233. The court did identify an exception under which the order would not
necessarily have to be found valid. Id. at 1233 n.11. Under an objective balancing test, an
invalid government order could still be considered "compulsory-by-law" if the reasonable
costs of disobeying the order and the probable tort liability outweighed the removal ex-
penses. Id. However, since the removal costs far exceeded the objective expectation of non-
compliance liability, the court found that this exception was not applicable. Id.
46 Id. at 1236 (quoting W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l,
493 U.S. 400, 406 (1990)).
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on international relations. 47 Instead of laying down rigid rules of ap-
plication, the Supreme Court has charged the lower courts with decid-
ing if a particular case creates a conflict between the judicial and
executive branches. 48 Finally, the court should refrain from inquiring
into the validity of the foreign sovereign act only if the adjudication
would embarrass or hinder the executive in the realm of foreign
relations.49
The court, however, ruled that the "rationale"50 supporting the
doctrine was not present in this case, and thus, concluded that an in-
quiry into the order's validity was not barred.51 The court also noted
that the litigation was between two private parties, that the dispute pri-
marily concerned the interpretation of a single contract clause, and
that Grupo Protexa had failed to offer any evidence suggesting an in-
quiry would cause diplomatic difficulties.5 2 In further support of its
conclusion, the court referenced its subsequent inquiry. showing that
Mexican policy was not at stake because no Mexican law specifically
granted the Port Captain authority to issue the order.5 3 On this basis,
the court declared that rather than attempting to circumvent Mexican
law, it was honoring and applying it.54
After an extensive review of Mexican Constitution, three main stat-
utes/conventions, and multiple subordinate provisions, the court de-
termined that the Port Captain did not in fact have the authority to
order the ship's removal.
5 5
47 Id. (quoting Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516,
520-21 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985)).
48 Id. (quoting Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc., 847
F.2d 1052, 1058 (3d Cir. 1988)).
49 Id. (quoting Allied Bank Int'L 757 F.2d at 521).
50 The court did not specifically define the rationale to which it was referring. How-
ever, the implication was that the act of state doctrine was only to be applied on an ad hoc
basis for situations which might hinder the executive's foreign relations. See id. at 1236 (de-
fining the doctrine's application).
51 Id. at 1237-38 (referencing W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp.,
Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990)) (commenting that even though the validity of a sovereign's
acts may be questioned, "the policies underlying the act of state doctrine may not justify its
application"). The court also stated that the claimant, Grupo Protexa, had the burden of
showing the doctrine's applicability. and that the claimant simply failed to meet this burden.
Id.
52 Id. at 1238.
53 Id.
54 Id
55 Id. at 1239-46. The statutory review was conducted because the Mexican Constitution
prohibited interference with a person's possessions: "No one may be bothered in his ...
possessions, except by means of written order issued by a competent authority providing the
basis and the reasons of the legal cause for the proceedings." Id. at 1240-41 n.26 (quoting
MEX. CONST. art. XVI). In effect, the Port Captain's order could be valid only if it was sup-
ported by some form of enabling legislation. Id.
The court first noted that the trial judge had examined the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea and ruled that it provided an insufficient basis for the order. Id. at
1241. The Third Circuit, however, did not review this ruling. Id. Next, the court addressed
Articles 86 and 9 of Mexican Navigation Law. Id. Article 86 provided that if a ship sinks in a
port or in a "general waterway of communication" in a manner which affects navigation, the
[VOL. 20
1995] DECLINE OF THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
Il. Background Law
A. The Myriad of Relevant Doctrines
Whenever there is a dispute involving a foreign sovereign, there
are several doctrines which may come into play. The first is comity, a
judicially created doctrine under which the courts of one sovereign
give effect to the laws and actions of a second sovereign.5 6 Comity is
neither an absolute obligation, nor mere courtesy and good will, 57 but
more of an expected degree of respect.58 In applying this principle, a
court may honor the legal pronouncements of a foreign sovereign 59
and if necessary, allow the foreign sovereign to seek redress in its fo-
rum.60 Closely related to the principle of comity are the choice-of-law
rules.61 Under these rules, an act occurring in a foreign jurisdiction
ship is to be removed as directed by the Navy Department. After receiving testimony on
Article 9 of the Mexican Navigation Law, the court found that location of the ship, the EEZ,
did not constitute a "general waterway of communication" and therefore, Article 86 did not
provide a basis for the Port Captain's order. Id.
Finally, the court examined Articles 262 and 263 of the Mexican Means of Communica-
tion Law." Id. at 1244. While the court acknowledged that Article 262 authorized the Port
Captain to commence an investigation of the sinking, it stated that the Article did not ad-
dress the question as to whether a government official could order a private citizen to pay for
a removal or other such expense. Id. Thus, the Article did not provide the required en-
abling provisions necessary to make the Port Captain's order valid. Id. However, the court
found that Article 263 did provide the required authority to order a ship's removal, but only
if the ship sank within a port or near enough nearby to affect the port. Id. Unfortunately,
the court found the EEZ to be too far from a port, forty-five miles, to cause an effect. Id.
Hence, this provision also failed to provide the necessary authority.
56 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990); see alsoJoel R. Paul, Comity in Interna-
tional Law, 32 HARV. INT'L LJ. 1, 3-4 (1991) (stating that even though the exact meaning of
comity remains unclear, it explains much of what courts do in international law (e.g., recog-
nizing and enforcing foreign judgments as well as limiting jurisdiction to handle claims)).
Comity in the international context, however, should not be confused with comity between
sister states which is mandated by the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
at 3 n.3.
57 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (explaining the limits of comity before
refusing to honor a French executory judgment against a U.S. citizen on the grounds that
France did not provide the United States reciprocal treatment); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 409 (1964) (quoting Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163-64) (arguing that under
comity the privilege to sue in U.S. courts had generally been granted unless the foreign
sovereign was at war with the United States)).
58 See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION To INTERNATIONAL LAw 250-51 (1988) (explain-
ing that courts are reluctant to intrude upon another nation's domain, even if the sensibili-
ties of the forum court are offended); see also Paul, supra note 56, at 6 (noting that U.S. courts
have justified deference as a sign of respect for foreign sovereigns).
59 BLAC'S LAw DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990); see alsoJANIs, supra note 58, at 251 (stat-
ing that the decision to grant comity, in concurrent jurisdiction disputes, is left to the ad hoc
discretion of the court). Irregularity or the appearance of unfairness in the foreign proceed-
ings are two reasons that may lead a court to deny comity. Id. at 260. While not determina-
tive, the foreign sovereign's reciprocity of treatment of U.S. judgments is yet another factor.
See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 408-11 (granting comity to Cuba despite Cuba's refusal to allow the
U.S. citizens to sue within its tribunals); JANIs, supra note 58, at 261.
60 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 412.
61 See id. at 438 (rejecting respondent's argument to apply the forum court's law merely
because the foreign sovereign was a participant in the dispute). The similarity between the
choice-of-law rules and comity is that both may lead the forum court to abandon its own laws
for those of the foreign sovereign. See Clyde Crockett,, The Relationship Between the Act of State
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would generally be judged by the laws of that nation. 62 Other doc-
trines also address the fundamental question of the appropriateness of
the forum. 63 Each doctrine, however, caters to a slightly different con-
cern. Any time that the foreign state is the defendant, the Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Act becomes applicable. 64 Under its auspices,
suits against foreign sovereigns are denied jurisdiction in U.S. courts
except in limited situations, 65 thereby rendering immunity to the state.
Another doctrine, forum non conveniens, is the prudential power of a
court to decline to hear cases ifjustice would be better served by mov-
ing the case to another forum.66 For example, if access to evidence,
availability of witnesses, and general practicality would be better served
in an alternate forum, a court has the discretion to dismiss the case to
that forum. 67 The political question doctrine is also applicable to for-
eign disputes. 68 A court should decline to hear a case ifjudicial resolu-
tion would infringe upon the respect due to coordinate branches of
government or create a potential embarrassment from the "multifari-
ous pronouncements by the various departments." 69 Finally, the act of
state doctrine protects the executive branch's foreign policy by restrict-
ing inquiry into the validity of a foreign sovereign's actions. 70 The act
of state doctrine incorporates similar considerations as the political
question doctrine7 and is sometimes characterized as its foreign
counterpart.72
Doctrine and the Conflict of Laws and Choice-of-Law Rules, 10 N.Y.L. SCH.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 309,
312 (1989) (describing the act of state doctrine as "a special choice-of-law rule which directs
that the law to be applied to resolve a particular issue is the [sovereign's) act itself, regardless of
its form") (emphasis added).
62 See Bazyler, supra note 5, at 388.
63 See generally Waller, supra note 2, at 101 (discussing the need to consolidate the vari-
ous doctrines into one unified theory in order to reduce judicial inefficiency).
64 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988).
65 Id. §§ 1604-1607 (1988). For example, foreign sovereigns are not protected from
tort suits or suits concerning purely commercial actions. Id. § 1605(a)(2)-(5).
66 Bazyler, supra note 5, at 385 (arguing that forum non conveniens is particularly appli-
cable to international disputes and that its balancing considerations make it more flexible
than the act of state doctrine); BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 655 (6th ed. 1990); cf Waller, supra
note 2, at 112 (emphasizing that the circumstances must be manifestly unjust to the
defendant).
67 Bazyler, supra note 5 at 386.
68 Id. at 389.
69 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
70 Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697 (1976).
71 Bazyler, supra note 5, at 390. Both the act of state doctrine and the political question
doctrine share the following criteria:
(1) constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate branch;
(2) lack ofjudicial standards for resolving the issue; and
(3) potential for embarrassing the executive.
Id. The other considerations found in the political question doctrine include:
(1) impossibility of deciding the issue without an initial policy determination
of a kind which should be made by nonjudicial discretion; or
(2) an unusual need for adherence to previously made political decision.
Id.
72 Fletcher Alford, Note, When Nations Kill: The Liu Case and the Act of State Doctrine in
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B. The Act of State Doctrine
1. Traditional View
In given circumstances, the act of state doctrine directs the court
to forego inquiry and presume that the act of a foreign state is valid. 73
While the doctrine has roots in the seventeenth century, 74 its tradi-
tional view was espoused in the 1897 Supreme Court case of Underhill
v. Hernandez.75 During the 1892 Venezuelan revolution, the revolu-
tionary military commander Hernandez detained an American to com-
plete an ongoing civil service project.76 The American citizen,
Underhill, later sought damages in a U.S. court suit. By the time the
suit was brought, however, Hernandez's government had been for-
mally recognized by the United States. 77 In dismissing the case, Chief
Justice Fuller wrote for a unanimous Court:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign pow-
ers as between themselves.
78
Following this statement, the Court refused to inquire into the validity
of Hernandez's acts which formed the basis of Underhill's tort claim.79
The Court essentially held that because Hernandez's party succeeded
in ousting the former government and because the United States had
recognized his party as the legitimate government of Venezuela, Her-
nandez's actions were imputable to the state, and therefore, presumed
valid and thereby immune from liability.80 Later, the Court empha-
sized that Underhill's act of state doctrine rested "upon the highest con-
siderations of international comity and expediency."8 1
2. The Turning Point
Underhill prevailed for the next sixty-seven years. In 1964, how-
ever, the act of state doctrine suffered a fundamental shift in its foun-
dation. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,8 2 the Court held that
Wrongful Death Suits, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 465, 473 n.41 (1989); Bazyler, supra
note 5, at 389-92.
73 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443
(1987) (act of state doctrine).
74 Alford, supra note 72, at 467 n.9 (referencing V~s; P. NANDA & DAVID PANsrus, LTGA-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL DIsPuTEs IN U.S. COURTS ch. 10, at 7 (1986)).
75 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
76 Id at 251.
77 Id
78 Id. at 252.
79 Id. at 254.
80 See id. at 253 (holding "idle" the argument that the revolutionary victors should be
treated as a mere mob).
81 See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918).
82 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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the act of state doctrine was founded on the theory of separation of
powers.8 3 The dispute arose out of Cuba's expropriation of C.A.V., a
sugar exporting corporation.8 4 Prior to the expropriation, an Ameri-
can company, Farr, Whitlock & Co. (Farr), had contracted for a ship-
ment of sugar.8 5 Unfortunately, Farr did not take delivery before the
expropriation, and pursuant to Cuba's expropriation enabling law,
Farr had to obtain permission from the Cuban government before the
ship could leave Cuban waters.8 6 In order to obtain this consent, Farr
entered into another contract with the Cuban government on terms
identical to those in the C.A.V. contract.8 7 Farr then accepted ship-
ment of the sugar.8 8 When Cuba demanded payment, Farr refused on
the grounds that C.A.V. was entitled to the funds.8 9 Cuba brought suit
in the District Court, and under court order, Farr delivered the funds
to the receiver, Sabbatino. 90 The District Court refused to apply the
act of state doctrine because Cuba's expropriation violated interna-
tional law.9 1 The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.9 2 The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 93
After determining that Cuba had a right to access U.S. courts and
that Cuba had, through its expropriation of C.A.V., gained a property
right in the sugar, the U.S. Supreme Court turned to the act of state
doctrine.9 4 The Court first ruled that while historic notions of sover-
eign authority were a factor to be considered, the act of state doctrine
was not mandated by international law. 95 The Court then restricted
earlier precedent 96 by stating that not "every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." 97 The
Court noted that even though the Constitution commits the conduct
of foreign relations to the executive branch, the Constitution does not
require the act of state doctrine nor does it irrevocably bar the judici-
ary from reviewing the validity of foreign acts of state.98 Instead, the
Court said that the act of state doctrine rises out of the basic relation-
83 Id. at 423.
84 Id. at 401. In response to U.S. reduction of sugar quotas, the Cuban government
expropriated property in which American nationals had an interest. I.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 404.
87 Id. Technically, Farr entered into the contract with Banco Para el Comercio Exterior
de Cuba, an instrumentality of the Cuban Government. d. at 405.
88 Id. at 405-06.
89 Id. at 406.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 406-07.
92 Id. at 407.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 408-15.
95 Id. at 421.
96 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S.
250 (1898).
97 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
98 Id. at 422.
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ship between the branches and expresses only a strong sense that judi-
cial inquiry in such cases may hinder rather than advance U.S.
interests. 99 Finally, the Court stated that the doctrine's vitality de-
pended upon its capacity to reflect correctly the proper distribution of
responsibility between the judiciary and the executive branches. 100
The Court then proceeded to define the doctrine's application.
As a basic tenet, the Court noted that "the greater the degree of codifi-
cation or consensus concerning a particular area of law, the more ap-
propriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions" in that area. 01
After observing that some issues will affect foreign policy more signifi-
cantly than others, the Court refused to establish any firm rule of appli-
cation. 102 Rather, the Court decided only that in the absence of a
treaty or other unambiguous agreement concerning the controlling
legal principles, the judiciary would not examine foreign sovereign ex-
propriation of property within its own territory.' 03 In light of this rul-
ing, the Court refused to consider Farr's counterclaim against the
Cuban government and awarded the disputed funds to Cuba. 0 4
While the Court ruled that the act of state doctrine barred review
of the Cuban expropriation, the Court's analysis caused a fundamental
shift in the doctrine's application. 10 5 No longer would sovereign acts
be protected by international law. Review of foreign sovereign activity
would depend primarily on the sovereign's current relationship with
the U.S. executive.
As part of this fundamental shift, the Court's decision has been
interpreted as directing the lower courts to perform case-by-case analy-
ses of a judicial inquiry's impact on the executive's foreign policy.' 0 6
The significance of this balancing was the standard to be employed.
Despite two letters from the State Department indicating that the exec-
utive branch had no objection to a judicial inquiry, 10 7 the Court re-
99 Id. at 423.
100 Id. at 428.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 423. Immediately after Sabbatino, Congress enacted the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment specifically forbidding the Court, based solely upon the act of state doctrine, to refuse
to inquire into the validity of expropriations. See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1988). However,
the courts have interpreted this Amendment narrowly and have essentially rendered it mean-
ingless. Bazyler, supra note 5, at 392-93.
104 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 439. The Court actually left the case open for continued factual
disputes but commented that it did not expect any to arise. Id.
105 See id. at 421 (holding that the doctrine is not compelled by sovereignty or interna-
tional law as earlier precedent seemed to imply); see id. at 423 (explaining that not every case
involving foreign relations is important enough to lie beyond judicial cognizance); see
Bazyler, supra note 5, at 334-35 (commenting that the modern version of the doctrine arose
from a trilogy of a cases starting with Sabbatino).
106 Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521 (2d Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985). The Sabbatino Court identified as obvious considerations
the degree of codification and consensus on the area of international law and the inquiry's
effect on foreign relations. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
107 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 407.
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fused to review the validity of the Cuban expropriation.10 8 The Court
based this refusal on the following: 1) the executive branch is better
equipped to handle mass problems such as country-wide expropria-
tion; 2) piecemeal dispositions could seriously interfere with ongoing
negotiations; 3) even after the executive has taken a position on the
foreign sovereign's acts, judicial review unfavorable to the foreign
soverign's acts might increase the offense to the foreign sovereign-
especially if the circumstances changed during the time before the
trial; and 4) in any case, conflict between the executive's position and
the judicial determination probably could not be avoided.10 9 The
Court even stated that interpretation of international law would even-
tually lead to judicial confusion and that this confusion itself could
embarrass the executive.110 In view of the State Department's support
of the inquiry, the standard employed by the Sabbatino Court was ex-
tremely protective."'
3. The Resulting Limitations
Despite Sabbatino's paternalistic perspective, the fundamental shift
in the doctrine's foundation set the stage for the doctrine's decline," 12
and over the next three decades the doctrine suffered continuous at-
tacks on its applicability. Starting in 1976 with the case of Alfred Dun-
hill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba," 3 the Court implied that third
party actions were not imputable to the sovereign unless the sovereign
had specifically issued an order, statute, decree, or resolution authoriz-
ing such actions.' 4 In 1960, Cuba nationalized several cigar manufac-
turers and installed "interventors" to take possession and control of the
combined business." 5 Some of the former American owners brought
suit to collect the accounts payable which had accrued before the date
108 Id. at 437.
109 Id. at 431-33.
110 Id. at 433 (refusing to address patently clear violations of international law).
11 See id. at 463 (White,J., dissenting) (arguing that refusal to inquire into the expropri-
ation was totally unwarranted).
112 Sabbatino's effect, however, was not immediate. Even until the early 1970s, lower
courts continued to strongly support the doctrine's applicability. In 1970, one court held
that whether an oil minister had acted within his authority was irrelevant. Interamerican Ref.
Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298-99 (D. Del. 1970). As seen in Galu,
the authority of an official is now critically important. See generally Galu v. Swissair: Swiss Air
Transp. Co., Ltd., 734 F. Supp. 129, 133-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (performing an extensive review
of the policeman's authority to forcibly expel the plaintiff from Switzerland). In 1971, a
Ninth Circuit district court refused to consider an antitrust claim which would have required
a finding that a foreign sovereign had acted fraudulently. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v.
Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972). Conversely, the Supreme Court later held that a finding of
wrongful conduct was irrelevant and that the act of state doctrine was applicable only if the
act's validity was questioned. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l,
493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990).
113 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
114 Id. at 695.
115 Id. at 685.
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of the nationalization.' 16 As an affirmative defense, the Cuban in-
terventors claimed that their refusal to return the disputed funds was
an act of state and therefore unreviewable. 117 This defense failed.
The Court first found that the interventors had been vested only
with the rights of possession and control of the business; they had not
been vested with the right to repudiate the debts incurred by the busi-
ness." 8 Second, the Cuban government had granted the interventors
only commercial power, not governmental power.1'9 Finally, the
Court stated that an attorney's mere assertion of the sovereign's denial
of liability was not evidence of an act of state.' 20 By failing to produce
a statute, decree, order, or resolution of the Cuban government itself,
the interventors had failed to show that their debt repudiation was im-
putable to the state.' 21 In conclusion, the Court stated that the act of
state doctrine did not protect a foreign sovereign's purely commercial
obligations. 122 Thus, Alfred Dunhill limited the doctrine in two ways.
First, mere sovereign involvement in a transaction does not necessarily
mean that a court will consider the transaction to be an act of state.' 23
Second, and more significantly, to qualify as a state act the action must
be an exertion of governmental power, not just a commercial
transaction. 124
In 1988, the Ninth Circuit attacked the doctrine from the reverse
side. In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos,125 the Philippine govern-
ment brought suit against its former president, Ferdinand Marcos. In
response to the Philippine government's allegations of racketeering,
Marcos claimed his actions were unreviewable pursuant to the act of
state doctrine. 12 6 The court, however, stated that the doctrine's pur-
pose was to protect against friction with the foreign policy of the
United States toward existing regimes.' 27 Because the legitimate gov-
ernment of the Philippines had ousted Marcos from power, inquiry
into Marcos' actions probably would not threaten the executive's for-
eign policy, and an inquiry into the validity of Marcos' actions was not
116 Id. at 686.
117 See id.
118 Id. at 692-93.
119 Id. at 693.
120 Id. at 694-95.
121 Id. at 695.
122 Id.
123 See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 607-08 (9th
Cir. 1976) (holding that court proceedings rarely qualify as state acts), cert. denied, 472 U.S.
1032 (1985).
124 See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., 425 U.S. at 703-05 (stating that "[i]n their commer-
cial capacities, foreign governments do not exercise powers peculiar to sovereigns. . . ." and
thereby noting that the adjudication of such disputes is unlikely to touch upon national
nerves).
125 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989).
126 Id. at 1360.
127 See id. (noting that the "balance of considerations" shifted once the disputed sover-
eign was no longer in power).
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barred. 128
Two years later, in Liu v. Republic of China,129 the Ninth Circuit
held that the doctrine did not protect foreign sovereign acts which
were consummated within the United States. The Republic of China's
(ROC) Director of the Defense Intelligence Bureau (DIB) had or-
dered the assassination of Henry Liu.130 While the order originated in
the Republic of China, the assassination actually occurred in the
United States.131 Henry Liu's widow brought a civil suit against the
Republic of China for wrongful death on the theory of respondeat
superior.1 32
To succeed, Liu's widow had to show that ROC's DIB Director,
Wong, had acted within his official capacity133 and that his actions
were not protected by either the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) nor the act of state doctrine. Because section 1605 (a) (5) of the
FSIA' 34 granted jurisdiction over cases involving personal injuries
caused by tortious acts within the United States, the court ruled the
FSIA did not bar the suit against the ROC government.1 35
The court then addressed the act of state doctrine. The court em-
phasized that the doctrine's purpose was to provide a flexible method
of avoiding embarrassment to the executive branch in the conduct -of
its foreign affairs.136 It then stated that the touchstone of the doctrine
was the potential interference with foreign relations.1 37 The court ob-
served that foreign sovereigns are particularly likely to be offended by
U.S. judicial instructions on how the sovereign should handle its inter-
nal affairs.13 8 Liu's assassination, however, was consummated within
the United States.139 Thus, the DIB Director's order was not a com-
pletely internal affair. Given this fact, the court stated that the ROC
could hardly contest U.S. judicial review. 140 Furthermore, because the
128 Id. at 1360-61. The court left the option open, however, for Marcos to produce evi-
dence which would swing the balancing test back in favor of applying the act of state' doc-
trine. Id. at 1361.
129 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. dismissed, 497 U.S. 1058 (1990).
130 Id. at 1422.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 1421.
133 "An employer is vicariously liable for the torts of employees committed within the
scope of their employment." Id. at 1426 (citing Alma W. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 123
Cal. App. 3d 133, 138-39, 176 Cal. Rptr. 287, 289 (1981)).
134 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1988).
135 Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1425 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. dismissed, 497 U.S.
1058 (1990).
136 Id. at 1432 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428
(1964)).
137 Id. (quoting International Ass'n of Machinist & Aerospace Workers (LAM) v. OPEC,
649 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981)).
138 Id.
139 Id. at 1422.
140 Id. at 1433. The court also observed that international consensus condemned mur-
der. Id. (referencing Organization of American States Convention on Terrorism, Oct. 8,
1976, art. 1, 27 U.S.T. 3949, 3957-58). As noted in Sabbatino, the greater the codification or
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assassination actually occurred within the United States, barring review
of the assassination would cause a far greater embarrassment to the
executive than the review itself. 41 Following these conclusions, the
court ruled that the ROC could be held liable for Liu's wrongful
death. 142
The 1990 Supreme Court case of W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environ-
mental Tectonics Corp., International143 handed the doctrine another sig-
nificant blow. The Court held that despite any resulting
embarrassment to the executive, the doctrine cannot be invoked un-
less the actual validity of the foreign act of state had to be ques-
tioned. 144  The plaintiff's antitrust case alleged that Nigerian
government officials had taken bribes when awarding a certain defense
contract. 145 The suit was against Environmental Tectonics and not
against the Nigerian government officials, and even though the suit
would impute the foreign officials with an illegal motive, the validity of
their actions would not be questioned. 146 Pursuant to the Racketeer
Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act, 147 the plaintiff had only to
show that the bribe occurred; illegality under Nigerian law was not re-
quired.1 48 The Court considered it irrelevant that the facts supporting
the claim would also establish the contract's illegality under Nigerian
law. 149
The defendants argued that comity, respect for the foreign sover-
eign, and avoidance of embarrassment to the executive warranted the
doctrine's application.' 50 They asserted that a determination that the
officials had accepted the bribe would impugn or question the nobility
of Nigeria's motivations and thus cause interference in the conduct of
the executive's foreign policy. 15 1 The Court recognized the similarity
consensus on an issue, the lesser the demand for the act of state doctrine's protection.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
The Republic of China (ROC) also argued that an earlier ROC tribunal finding quali-
fied as an act of state and thus, was unreviewable. Liu, 892 F.2d at 1433. The ROC tribunal
had found that Wong, ROC Director of the Defense Intelligence Bureau, acted solely in his
personal capacity when he ordered the assassination. Id. at 1423. The court rejected this
argument and held that foreign trials do not constitute a protected act of state since such
trials are not the normal "way in which the state exercises its jurisdiction to give effect to its
public interests." Id. at 1433 (referencing Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. &
S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985)).
141 Lit, 892 F.2d at 1433.
142 Id. at 1434.
143 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
144 Id. at 409-10.
145 Id. at 401-02.
146 Id. at 401.
147 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968 (1988).
148 W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400,
405 (1990).
149 See id. at 406.
150 Id. at 408.
151 Id
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between this argument and that of the Sabbatino balancing ap-
proach. 152 The Court, however, drew a sharp distinction between us-
ing balancing to dismiss the doctrine and using balancing to invoke
the doctrine. 153 After reemphasizing its obligation to decide properly
presented cases, the Court refused to apply the doctrine merely be-
cause an inquiry might embarrass the foreign government.' 54 In con-
clusion, the Court held that the act of state doctrine only requires that
in the process of deciding a case, the actions of a foreign sovereign
taken within its own jurisdiction shall be deemed valid. 155 If the valid-
ity of an action is not questioned, the doctrine does not bar review.' 56
Immediately following Environmental Tectonics, the doctrine exper-
ienced yet another decline in the Second Circuit case of Galu v. Swis-
sair: Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd.,' 57 which concerned a Swiss alien
expulsion dispute. Galu had been previously criminally charged with
harassment, but then released with the understanding that she was to
leave Switzerland.' 58 Two days later, however, she returned to Switzer-
land and obtained employment with the United Nations. 159 Subse-
quently, the Geneva Department of Justice arrested her, ordered her
expulsion, and forcibly placed her upon a Swiss Air plane destined for
New York.' 60 Galu brought a civil suit against the airline for transport-
ing her against her will1 6 1 Because Swiss Air acted upon the police's
direction, its liability turned on whether the police department's ac-
tions qualified as acts of state. 162
After directing the trial court to reexamine whether Galu's forced
expulsion by Swiss police officers could be imputed to Switzerland, 163
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an approach 164 which
essentially nullified the doctrine's usefulness. In the earlier appeal,
the court had said that the issue was not whether the police officers
may have slightly exceeded their authority.165 Rather, the issue was
whether the police actions constituted an exercise of sovereign author-
ity or merely an ad hoc decision wholly unratified by the govern-
ment. 166 On remand, however, the trial court examined the police's
152 Id. at 409.
153 Id.
154 f&
155 J&
156 IM. at 409-10.
157 734 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y.), affld, 923 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1990).
158 Id. at 130.
159 IM
160 1&
161 Id. at 129.
162 Id. at 133-34.
163 Galu v. Swissair: Swiss Air Transp. Co., Ltd., 873 F.2d 650, 654-55 (2d Cir. 1989)
(hereinafter Galu I].
164 Galu v. Swissair: Swiss Air Transp. Co., Ltd., 923 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1990) [hereinafter
Galu II].
165 Galu I, supra note 163, 873 F.2d at 654.
166 Id. (referencing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980)). But see
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actions much more closely than was necessary to dispel theacts as "ad
hoc." 167 The Court of Appeals affirmed. 168
The trial court first asked whether the police officers' immediate
enforcement of the expulsion order could render their actions wholly
unratified. 169 After closely examining Swiss law, receiving expert wit-
nesses, and noting a Swiss tribunal's holding that Galu's immediate
expulsion was lawful, the district court held that in regard to the tim-
ing, the police actions were conclusively legal.170 Upon similar evi-
dence, the court held that the police's use of physical force was also
legal. 171 In particular, the court noted that under Swiss law, police act
independently only when they "act pursuant to an order which appears
on its face to be null and void."1 72 Finally, the court rejected the plain-
tiff's assertions that the police actions were ad hoc because she had
been denied her choice in destination. 173 In doing so, the court distin-
guished Swiss precedent and performed a balancing test, weighing
Swiss public interests against Galu's private rights.1 74
The significance of this analysis was that the examination is much
more extensive than required to show the police's actions were imputa-
ble to the state.1 75 This level of examination essentially showed the
police actions were in fact valid-the very inquiry precluded by the
doctrine. Thus, in answering the preliminary question as to whether
the actions qualified as an act of state, the court essentially circum-
vented the act of state doctrine. In essence, the court had conducted
the precluded inquiry in order to justify why inquiry itself could be
performed.
IV. Significance of the Case
On its face, Protexa II simply implies that "compulsory-by-law" in-
surance arguments will be measured by the same standard regardless
of whether the contested order was given by a foreign official or by a
U.S. official. Absent overriding concerns, the act of state doctrine will
not bar inquiry into the validity of foreign official's acts, orders, or de-
Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1299 (1970) (holding
that the question of an official's authority was irrelevant).
167 See, e.g., Galu v. Swissair: Swiss Air Transp. Co., Ltd., 734 F. Supp. 129, 134-38
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (explaining the "ad hoc" standard and applying it to three contested issues:
(1) the timing of the expulsion, (2) the use of force by the police officers, and (3) the denial
of the plaintiff's choice of destination).
168 Galu II, supra note 164, 923 F.2d at 842.
169 Galu, 734 F. Supp. at 134.
170 Id. at 134-36.
171 Id. at 136-37.
172 Id. at 137.
173 Id. at 139.
174 Id. at 138.
175 See Waller, supra note 2, at 118 (stating that a quick look at the merits of an interna-
tional transaction case was necessary to determine the appropriateness of the forum, but that
such quick looks should be limited).
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crees.1 76 Thus, to assure coverage, an insured party must contest for-
eign orders to the same degree that they would contest a U.S. order.
Despite the equity of this logic, Protexa H furthers the demise of the act
of state doctrine.
Protexa II demonstrates several inconsistent analytical approaches
currently used in the application of the doctrine. Several examples of
this inconsistent analysis include bootstrapping the balancing tests,
performing an overly specific inquiry into an official's particular pow-
ers,17 7 employing a realistic versus a protective balancing standard, 178
and distinguishing between sword and shield applications of the doc-
trine. 179 These approaches are inconsistent in that they conflict with
the doctrine's purposes and prohibit it from accomplishing its stated
goals. Despite these conflicts, however, the current treatment of the
doctrine leads to appropriate results. Hence, there has been little
pressure to correct these errors, even though the doctrine's strength
has been severely weakened. By following this trend, Protexa II adds
even more weight in favor of abandoning the doctrine in toto.
A. Inconsistencies of Purpose and Application
1. Purposes and Caveats of the Act of State Doctrine
The Protexa II court refused to apply the doctrine's inquiry preclu-
sion because it found that the rationales supporting the doctrine were
absent in the Protexa IIfacts. 180 The doctrine's modern stated purpose
is to protect the executive branch from embarrassment in the execu-
176 See Protexa II, supra note 12, 20 F.3d 1224, 1239 (3d Cir. 1994) (discouraging plain-
tiffs from seeking to establish rights under invalid government orders and recognizing that
application of the doctrine would disturb the underlying legal insurance regime).
177 See generally Galu v. Swissair: Swiss Air Transp. Co., Ltd., 734 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 923 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1990) (carefully scrutinizing Swiss law to determine whether
police had the authority to physically and immediately expel an alien charged with harass-
ment); see infra notes 208-19 and accompanying text.
178 E.g., Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 1988) (ex-
plaining that the balance of considerations was shifted where the actions questioned are
those of a former dictator ousted by the current and formally recognized government), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1990); see also, e.g., General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d
1376, 1382 (1993) (stating that the status of the parties at the time of suit was not the perti-
nent question as to whether the act of state doctrine applied); see generally, e.g., Liu v. Repub-
lic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1432-34 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining that the act of state doctrine
should not be applied because the foreign sovereign could hardly be affronted by a U.S.
inquiry into the validity of the assassination order resulting in a murder within the United
States).
179 The Protexa II opinion implies that Grupo Protexa was the first to assert the act of
state doctrine as a sword. See Protexa H, supra note 12, 20 F.3d at 1230 (noting the trial court's
reluctance to allow the act of state doctrine to be used as a sword while not citing any other
relevant prior case history). However, a Ninth Circuit district court also made this distinc-
tion in 1979. Than v. Blumenthal, 469 F. Supp. 1202, 1210 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (refusing to
allow the plaintiff to use the doctrine as a sword to force distribution of disputed U.S. assets
in a foreign sovereign's bank), modified, 658 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1069 (1982).
180 Protexa II, supra note 12, 20 F.3d at 1236-37.
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tion of its foreign policy. 18 1 It is neither based upon international law
nor mandated by the Constitution,' 8 2 and it focuses on protecting the
U.S. executive branch rather than the image and integrity of foreign
governments.18 3 By restricting judicial inquiry into the validity of for-
eign government actions occurring on their own soil,' 8 4 the doctrine
simply allows prudential abstention on foreign issues that would be
more efficiently handled by the executive branch.'
8 5
Every case, however, is not important enough to merit the doc-
trine's application.' 8 6 In fact, courts must be mindful of their obliga-
tion to hear properly presented cases.1 8 7 As a methodological
approach, a court will first ask if an issue requires questioning the va-
lidity of a state's actions.188 Second, the court will ask if the action falls
into one. of several exceptions. Finally, if the doctrine is applicable, the
court will conduct a balancing test to determine whether judicial in-
quiry may substantially embarrass the executive branch.'8 9 A common
issue raised by the first question is whether the actions of a particular
official qualify as a state action. As a general rule, an individual offi-
cial's actions will be imputed to the foreign state if that official had the
authority to act for and bind the foreign state. 19 0 The asserting party,
however, has the burden of proving both that a particular act qualifies
as an act of state' 9 1 and that an inquiry could hinder or embarrass the
executive branch's execution of foreign policy.' 9 2
2. Discrepancies Between Purpose and Application
a. Bootstrapping the Balancing Test
The primary inconsistency demonstrated by Protexa II was the
court's method of applying the balancing test.' 93 The court concluded
181 See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697 (1976).
182 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964).
183 SeeW.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 409
(1990).
184 Id. at 409-10.
185 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 431-33.
186 See id. at 423.
187 Environmental Tectonics, 493 U.S. at 409.
188 See id.
189 No specific level of embarrassment has been identified. However, the threat of em-
barrassment must be more than speculative. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l v. W.S.
Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1061 (3d Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 493 U.S.
400 (1990).
190 See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 694 (1976).
191 See id. at 691.
192 See Protexa II, supra note 12, 20 F.3d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that the
plaintiff failed to show any diplomatic difficulties would arise from the inquiry).
193 Id. Technically, the court failed to follow the strict analytical approach established
under Environmental Tectonics. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics
Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990) (refusing to perform a balancing test unless the validity,
as opposed to motivation, of a sovereign action was questioned). Rather, the court jumped
immediately to the third question as to whether judicial inquiry could hinder or embarrass
the executive branch's foreign policy. See Protexa II, supra note 12, 20 F.3d at 1237 n.18
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that an inquiry into the order's validity would not hinder Mexican-U.S.
relations.1 94 However, the court buttressed this conclusion with its
later analysis of the Port Captain's authority.1 95 This subsequent analy-
sis showed that the Mexican legislature had not authorized the Port
Captain to make such an order.' 96 On this basis, the court claimed to
honor and apply Mexican law.197 To what degree the court used this
subsequent analysis to support its conclusion is unknown. However, at
least to a certain extent, the court used the very inquiry precluded by
the doctrine (i.e., examination of the legal validity of the Port Cap-
tain's order) to justify why the inquiry itself could be made.
This bootstrapping method of analysis circumvents the doctrine's
purpose. When applicable, the doctrine bars any judicial inquiry, not
just those judicial decisions which fail to honor and apply foreign
law.198 Protection of the executive's foreign policy is the doctrine's
accepted modern basis. 199 However, underlying this basis is a theory
similar to comity,200 which encourages courts to recognize the actions
and decisions of foreign sovereigns.201 Rather than inquire into the
validity of a foreign sovereign act, a court should treat a foreign sover-
eign act to be a determination that the act is in fact valid.202 By not
assuming the act's validity, the court denies the foreign sovereign
"comity" regardless of whether the court agrees or disagrees with the
foreign sovereign's actions.
The problem with this denial is that a finding by a U.S. court con-
cerning the validity of a foreign sovereign's act is merely a
nonauthoritative finding.203 That finding carries little weight in the
foreign nation itself, and it is certainly not binding upon that nation.
(assuming substantial Mexican interest and declining to address the argument that the Port
Captain's order may not have been sufficient enough to invoke the doctrine). The court also
failed to discuss whether the order fell subject to one of the doctrine's exceptions. Id.
194 Protexa I, supra note 12, 20 F.3d at 1238.
195 Id.
196 1d.
197 Id.
198 See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 409
(1990) (holding that when deciding a case, the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their
jurisdictions shall be deemed valid).
199 Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697 (1976)
200 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 458-59 (1964) (White,J, dissent-
ing) (explaining why the act of state doctrine should not be applied to clear violations of
international law even though principles of comity underlying the doctrine warrant enforce-
ment of a foreign sovereign act).
201 In a strict sense, comity is the reciprocity of recognition. BLACK'S LAw DicriONARY
267 (6th ed. 1990). Under comity, a court will give a foreign sovereign access to its forum,
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 409, and recognize and enforce the foreign sovereign's acts. Id. at 458
(White, J., dissenting). However, comity does not necessarily require that a foreign sover-
eign's actions be deemed valid. Id. at 458-59 (White, J., dissenting).
202 Environmental Tectonics, 493 U.S. at 409.
203 Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola De Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521 (2d Cir.)
(noting that the foreign sovereign's courts would surely disregard any U.S. court decision
which declared the foreign sovereign acts invalid), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985).
[VOL. 20
DECLINE OF THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
Absent crimes against humanity, a foreign nation is free to define what
is and is not the law within its borders.20 4 Thus, denying this "comity"
to the foreign sovereign will lead to one of two results. First, if the
court finds that the action was valid, the court has done nothing more
than patronize the foreign sovereign. Its stamp of approval is similar
to a parent patting his child on the back and telling him that he has
done well. By passing judgment on the foreign sovereign's act, the
United States is saying that it has the power to sanction the act and that
the foreign sovereign must in some way seek U.S. approval of its gov-
ernmental operations. Despite its current world status, the United
States is not a parent; all sovereigns are equals. Thus, a foreign sover-
eign cannot but help being offended by the suggestion that they are in
someway subordinate to the United States.
Second, if the court finds that the act was invalid, the court essen-
tially has rejected the foreign sovereign's interpretation of its own laws.
While courts are adept at interpreting the law, the foreign sovereign
will usually have participated in creating the laws for its nation. Fur-
ther, the foreign sovereign will generally have substantial influence in
further refining the laws for its nation. In balance, the foreign sover-
eign's interpretation of its own laws should be afforded more weight
than the interpretation by a U.S. court. Thus, a U.S. court's finding of
invalidity is nothing more than a lower authority repudiating the deci-
sions of a higher authority.
While the evils of such inquiries can be justified,20 5 the courts
should recognize their true position within the world order, and the
courts should be careful how they support these justifications.206 After
a court concludes that the balancing test allows judicial inquiry, com-
mon sense dictates that a court should reaffirm its conclusion by exam-
ining the foreign law itself. However, the doctrine precludes such
examination unless the balancing test shows no likelihood of hinder-
ance or embarrassment to the executive's foreign policy.207 Thus,
bootstrapping the balancing test is a fundamentally incorrect method
of applying the act of state doctrine. As this practice continues, the
doctrine becomes weaker in its protection of actions by foreign
sovereigns.
204 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 430 (noting that laws formulated under imperialistic doc-
trine may not be suitable for emerging states and that international laws may not bind states
which have not consented to them).
205 See infra part IV.B.
206 Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1432 (9th Cir. 1989) (advising caution when
instructing foreign sovereigns how they must manage their resources), cert. dismissed, 497 U.S.
1058 (1990).
207 SeeW.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 409-
10 (1990) (holding that the balancing test is relevant only if the validity of a state act is
questioned).
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b. Circumvention of the Doctrine by Inquiry into the
Official's Authority
A common discrepancy similar to that of bootstrapping is the
overly-specific inquiry into the foreign official's authority. 20 8 The first
step of applying the act of state doctrine is to determine whether an
issue requires inquiry into the validity of a state act.20 9 The actions of
any particular official will not be automatically imputed to the foreign
sovereign.2 10 If the act cannot be imputed, then the doctrine simply
does not apply.211 Obviously, some form of inquiry into the official's
authority has to be conducted.
The problem with this inquiry is the degree to which it is currently
conducted. For example, the Second Circuit has asked whether the
particular act was an exercise of sovereign authority or merely a wholly
ad hoc decision by that particular official; legality of the act is irrele-
vant. 21 2 Unfortunately, its lower courts have ignored the "wholly ad
hoc" standard, and the apparent trend supports a close examination of
the official's precise authority to perform the disputed act.213 If the
official is not authorized, then no act of state exists, and the doctrine
does not bar the inquiry into the act's validity.2 14 Ironically, because
the action was not authorized, the validity question has already been
answered. Similarly, if the official was authorized, the only grounds for
finding the act invalid will be found in either the international law or
the foreign nation's own constitutional law. In effect, a finding that
208 The Protexa II court actually avoided this discrepancy by assuming that the Port Cap-
tain's order qualified as an act of state. Protexa II, supra note 12, 20 F.3d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir.
1994) (refusing to decide on the defendant's assertion that the Port Captain's order was not
an act of state). However, this Note discusses this discrepancy because of its similarity to the
bootstrapping problem and the recent support for this error. See, e.g., Galu v. Swissair: Swiss
Air Transp. Co., 734 F. Supp. 129, 134 (S.D.N.Y.) (extensively investigating authority of po-
lice officers), aff'd, 923 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1990). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443 cmt. (i) (1987). Under the Restatement:
[a]n action or declaration by an official may qualify as an act of state, but only
upon a showing (ordinarily by the party raising the issue) that the official had
authority to act for and bind the state.... The act of state doctrine does not
preclude an initial inquiry as to whether a challenged act is in fact an act of
state ....
Id.
209 Environmental Tectonics, 493 U.S. at 409-10 (holding the doctrine inapplicable if the
validity of the act is not at issue).
210 Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 691-93 (1976); see
also supra note 208 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 443 cmt. (i) (1987)).
211 See generally Galu I, supra note 163, 873 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1989) (questioning whether
policemen's actions qualified as a state act).
212 Id. at 654. See also supra note 208 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443 cmt. (i) (1987)).
213 See Galu v. Swissair: Swiss Air Transp. Co., Ltd. 734 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 923
F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1990). See also supra note 208 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443 cmt. (i) (1987)).
214 See supra note 208 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 443 cmt. (i) (1987)).
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the official was authorized will often necessitate a finding that the ac-
tion was valid. Again, the precluded validity question has already been
answered by a so-called preliminary applicability question.
A modern hypothetical of this discrepancy can be drawn from the
Protexa II facts. Whether the act of state doctrine applied to the Port
Captain's order would depend on the Port Captain's authority to issue
such an order. The Port Captain's jurisdiction existed by virtue of the
Mexican presidential decree. 21 5 However, under the Mexican Consti-
tution, no person may be burdened by the government except by writ-
ten order issued by a competent authority. 2 16 By analogy to U.S. law,
the court assumes this constitutional provision implies that the Port
Captain was unauthorized to make such an order unless a specific stat-
ute granted him the authority to make the order.21 7 After examining
three primary statutes and four subordinate statutes, the court fails to
find any grant of authority. 2 18 The court then concludes that the Port
Captain's act cannot be imputed; therefore, the act of state doctrine is
inapplicable. Hence, the inquiry is not prohibited.
However, if the Port Captain typically makes such orders, the Mex-
ican government's acquiescence should be taken as its interpretation
that the Port Captain did in fact have the authority to make the order.
By finding otherwise, the U.S. court has again denied "comity" to the
foreign sovereign's interpretation of its own nation's laws.
One solution to this dilemma is to allow a preliminary inquiry, but
only on a limited "quick look" level.2 19 As a preliminary question, the
court could be restricted to the following questions: 1) does the offi-
cial normally exercise this general type of power; 2) does the foreign
sovereign law clearly and unambiguously proscribe such actions; and
3) can the action be characterized as one for the public's interests. By
asking these questions, the court would cull any disputes which clearly
were not imputable to the sovereign while at the same time affording
"comity" to actions to which the foreign sovereign has apparently
acquiesced.
c. Realistic View of the Risks to the Executive's Foreign
Policy
A third conflict between the doctrine's purpose and application
concerns the perspective used by the courts to perform the balancing
test. Theoretically, the executive branch is better able to ascertain and
handle foreign policy problems. 220 To maximize the doctrine's effect,
215 Protexa II, supra note 12, 20 F.3d 1224, 1240 (3d Cir. 1994).
216 Id. at 1240, 1241 n.26.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 1241-46.
219 See Waller, supra note 2, at 118 (suggesting a limited quick look at the merits to deter-
mine whether the U.S. court is an appropriate forum).
220 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 431-32 (1964).
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a court should surrender to the executive branch any issue which
could potentially affect foreign policy.2 21 In Protexa II, judicial inquiry
into the Port Captain's authority could have been inferred as an at-
tempt by the United States to limit Mexico's Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) 222 Because such a repudiation could affect ongoing negotia-
tions in treaties and economic agreements, the court arguably should
have presumed the Port Captain's actions valid in order to maximize
the doctrine's effect.
In fact, this paternalistic standard was used in the landmark case
Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino.223 The Sabbatino Court refused to
pass on the validity of Cuban expropriations 22 4 even after the State
Department had specifically made a statement that it did not want to
comment. The Court reasoned that foreign nations may resent other
sovereign's courts passing judgment on the foreign nation's actions.2 25
The Court also noted that political reasons may prohibit the executive
branch from speaking and that conflicts between judicial pronounce-
ments and executive policy could not be avoided. 226 The Court went
as far as to say that the drawing of any lines of impermissible interna-
tional law violations would cause areas of judicial uncertainty and that
this uncertainty itself might embarrass the executive.2 27 On these
grounds, the Court refused to inquire into the validity of the Cuban
actions.228
Obviously, this perspective is no longer used, and Protexa II only
follows a well-established trend. Immediately after the Sabbatino deci-
sion, Congress enacted the Hickenlooper Amendment 229 which for-
bids the courts from refusing to examine the validity of expropriations
on the basis of the act of state doctrine unless so directed by the Presi-
dent.23 0 The courts claim to read this Amendment narrowly.23 1 How-
ever, the cases since Sabbatino have employed a much more realistic
interpretation of the risks to the executive's foreign policy. 232
221 See Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir. 1988) (stat-
ing the maximum effect of the act of state doctrine was to bar review of any issue which might
offend a foreign government), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989).
222 Contra Protexa II, supra note 12, 20 F.3d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1994) (denying that the
issues of Mexican policy were at stake).
223 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
224 Id. at 432.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 432-33.
228 Id. at 437.
229 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1994).
230 Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 111 (C.D. Cal.
1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
231 Id. at 112.
232 See Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
act of state doctrine may render a foreign government liable for a murder within the United
States), cert. dismissed, 497 U.S. 1058 (1990); Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d
1355, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1988) (implying that no risk to foreign policy exists by reviewing the
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This realistic perspective is appropriate. The courts have an obli-
gation to hear cases which are properly presented,233 and the act of
state doctrine is only a prudential concern. 234 It is not mandated by
the Constitution, nor international law,235 and a court should not
abandon its obligation merely on a speculation of harm to the con-
ducting of foreign relations by the executive branch. 236
However, use of this realistic perspective weakens the act of state
doctrine. The doctrine essentially shifts the responsibility to the execu-
tive branch for managing foreign disputes. Because the executive
branch is better equipped to influence the conduct of foreign sover-
eigns, it should be the one deciding whether an inquiry into the valid-
ity of the action would be harmful.237  Presumably, a realistic
perspective yields fewer cases than a paternalistic standard. Thus, a
realistic standard reduces the executive branch's control over cases af-
fecting foreign policy.
Ironically, the Supreme Court has not formally recognized one of
the doctrine's well-known exceptions that allows review even if the
Court would have otherwise assumed the validity of a foreign sover-
eign's act.238 This exception is named after the lower court case, Bern-
stein v. Van Heyghen Freres, S.A., 239 in which the court reversed itself and
actions of a deposed dictator), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989); Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 608 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that ajudicial decision
normally would not qualify as an act of state because the judicial decision only involved the
dispute resolution between two private parties), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
233 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp.,
Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990).
234 Liu, 892 F.2d at 1431.
235 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 431 (1964).
236 Protexa II, supra note 12, 20 F.3d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1994).
237 But see Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521 n.2
(2d Cir.) (stating that invocation of the doctrine is ultimately and always ajudicial question),
cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985).
238 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 419-20. Moroever, the Restatement has commented:
In Sabbatino, the Court indicated that it was not inclined toward having
applicability of the act of state doctrine depend on the wishes of the Executive
Branch. In First Nat'l City Bank, the State Department's Legal Advisor wrote a
"Bernstein letter," and three members of the Court relied upon that letter as a
rationale for their decision sustaining a counterclaim for set-off based on ex-
propriation of property in Cuba. The other six Justices, including the two who
concurred in the result and four dissenters, rejected the Bernstein exception.
In Dunhill, the State Department again wrote a Bernstein letter, but it was not
decisive to the outcome.
It seems that if the State Department issues a letter requesting that the
courts not review the validity of a particualr act, such a letter will be highly
persuasive if not binding. If the State Department issues a letter stating that it
has no objection on foreign relations grounds to adjudication of the validity of
a given act of a foreign state, courts in the United States will make their own
determination as to whether to apply the act of state doctrine, taking the view
of the Executive Branch into account but not being bound by it.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 443 reporter's
note 8 (1987) (citations omitted).
239 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
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inquired into the actions of Nazi officials after the State Department
issued a letter stating that an inquiry would not affect its foreign policy.
Under the Bernstein exception, a court will hear a case should the exec-
utive branch explicitly state that the inquiry will not affect its foreign
policy.240 In Sabbatino, this nonrecognition was based on the paternal-
istic perspective that courts were better informed than the executive
branch as to what inquiries would damage U.S. foreign policy.241 In
effect, refusal to recognize the Bernstein exception implied that the
courts should yield more cases to the executive branch's control.
At a single glance, the realistic perspective seems to conflict with
the nonrecognition of the Bernstein exception. This conflict can be
reconciled by realizing that the courts are simply retaining the power
of decision for themselves. 242 Not only are the courts reluctant to con-
sider outside influences on their decision to yield, today they are less
willing to yield at all. This stronger desire to retain power inherently
weakens the act of state doctrine. As a prudential concern, the doc-
trine now affords less deference to foreign sovereigns.
d. Distinction in Use: Sword Versus Shield
In a closing comment, the Protexa II court expressed its reluctance
to apply the act of state doctrine in situations where the doctrine was
being applied as a sword rather than as a shield.243 Essentially, the
court implied that a plaintiff seeking judicial redress should not be
able to foreclose review of the central issue merely by his choice of
forum.244 As an equitable argument, this reluctance seems to carry
significant weight. However, the act of state doctrine is based upon
concern for the executive branch's foreign policy. Equitable argu-
ments generally focus on the individual parties. Thus, the main prob-
lem with this argument is its lack of relevance to the purposes behind
the doctrine.
This argument also suffers from another deficiency-it does not
distinguish between sword and shield uses. Does the court imply that
only defendants may raise the doctrine? Or does the court mean that
the doctrine should only be used as an affirmative defense to either a
claim or counterclaim? In many instances, there is only a blurred dis-
240 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 419.
241 See supra notes 94-111 and accompanying text (discussing the Sabbatino Court's ra-
tionale for not reviewing the validity of Cuban expropriations).
242 See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 790-93 (1972)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (commenting that the Bernstein exception allowed the political
branches to dictate the results in ajudicial matter); but see Bazyler, supra note 5, at 328 (alleg-
ing that under the current act of state doctrine, the courts bow down to every executive
whim).
243 Protexa II, supra note 12, 20 F.3d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1994).
244 Id. at 1239. Grupo Protexa could have brought the case in a Mexican court. By
bringing the case in the U.S. court, Grupo Protexa sought to employ the act of state doctrine
to score an automatic win. Id. at 1235.
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tinction between an affirmative defense and essential element. In
Protexa II, for example, the plaintiff sought reimbursement for the re-
moval costs of a sunken ship.245 The policy covered costs compelled by
law. 246 Was it the plaintiff's or the defendant's responsibility to show
that an official's order was valid?2 47 As in Protexa II, not every issue is
well defined. In these cases, applying a sword/shield distinction might
be deemed arbitrary. The sword/shield distinction is, however, worka-
ble. The courts can identify what evidence constitutes a primae facie
claim and which party has the burden for rebutting given presump-
tions. But if the courts adopt this distinction, the act of state doctrine
will suffer yet another blow to its usefulness.
B. Appropriateness of the Judgment
1. Inequitable Use of the Doctrine as a Sword
Despite the apparent inconsistencies between the purposes and
application of the doctrine, Protexa II shows that the doctrine's current
treatment leads to proper judgments. First, simple equity argues
against use of the doctrine as a sword. Disregarding the impact on
foreign relations, claimants should not be able to seek redress while
simultaneously precluding examination of all the relevant facts.2 48
This strategy is analogous to a criminal defendant asserting his good
character and then objecting when the prosecutor introduces evidence
in rebuttal.249 The inequity of this strategy is even greater where the
plaintiff could have brought the suit in the courts of the foreign na-
tion. One must then question whether the plaintiff strategically chose
the U.S. courts merely because the plaintiff knew that the disputed
government action would be found invalid in the foreign sovereign's
own courts.
The Protexa II court shared this exact suspicion. 250 Protexa was a
Mexican corporation.2 5 1 The events transpired in Mexico's Exclusive
Economic Zone.2 5 2 And the Mexican plaintiff resisted the defendant's
attempts to dismiss the case under the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens.2 53 Even though Protexa had legitimate reasons for choosing a
245 Id. at 1225.
246 Id. at 1226:
247 See id. at 1227-28 (failing to clearly identify who had the burden).
248 Id. at 1239 (fearing the onslaught of plaintiffs seeking to establish rights under inva-
lid orders).
249 In a criminal case, the prosecution may not introduce character evidence to-show
conformity; however, he may use such evidence to rebut the defendant's evidence of good
character after the defendant has put his character in issue. FED. R. EvmD. 404(a).
250 See Protexa I, supra note 12, 20 F.3d at 1239 (noting that Protexa was seeking an
outcome determinative advantage from its forum selection).
251 Id. at 1226.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 1235. The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a case to be dismissed if
there is a better forum in which to hear'the dispute. Bazyler, supra note 5, at 38. That
Protexa fought against this motion is significant because one would assume a plaintiff would
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U.S. court,254 Protexa should not also be given the unfair advantage of
precluding review of the very issue upon which the case stood. To
have done so would effectively have given Protexa an automatic victory
merely by granting Protexa access to the U.S. court.
2. Diminutive Impact on the Foreign Policy
Second, the inquiry will not affect the executive's foreign policy.
Inquiry into the validity of the Port Captain's authority causes only a
diminutive impact on the Mexican government. 255 The inquiry in no
way binds Mexico. If it desires, Mexico remains free to authorize the
Port Captain's orders. Nor does the inquiry significantly encourage
other shipowners to challenge the Port Captain's authority. Appar-
ently, such challenges were already routine.2 56 Further, the challenge
was to the authority of a Port Captain. Unlike a challenge to the au-
thority of a military commander, a department of state, or the presi-
dent himself, this challenge should not severely implicate the dignity
of the foreign sovereign to as great of an extent.257 Lastly, the dispute
did not involve the Mexican government, but rather two independent
corporations. Thus, the inquiry is only a collateral challenge to the
Mexican government. As such, the challenge was more closely akin to
a question of foreign law than it was to a direct challenge of the validity
of the Port Captain's order. U.S. courts are specifically authorized to
examine foreign law25 8 and have routinely done so. 259
In addition, because the inquiry will not have a significant impact
on the Mexican government, it will not likely affect U.S. foreign policy.
In an extenuated sense, the inquiry will in fact benefit Mexico. If the
court had applied the doctrine, and thereby presumed the validity of
the order, U.S. insurance companies would have faced increased insur-
ance risks. As a result, the insurance companies would be forced to
either increase premiums or decrease coverage of Mexican operations.
By performing the inquiry, the court lowered the insurance company's
liabilities and fostered more competitive rates for the Mexican policy
normally prefer to fight a legal battle in its own courts. The obvious inference is that Protexa
knew a Mexican court would decide in the defendant's favor.
254 The defendants were U.S. corporations with no assets in Mexico; the policy was is-
sued by agents in the United States; the premiums and adjustments were to be paid in U.S.
dollars; and any judgment by a Mexican court would still have to be executed in the United
States. Protexa II, supra note 12, 20 F.3d at 1236.
255 See id. at 1238 (stating that the holding placed no limitations on the Mexican
government).
256 Protexa's own witness, a noted Mexican lawyer, testified that he had personally chal-
lenged twenty-five to thirty removal orders during his career. Id. at 1238 n.19.
257 Cf Galu I, supra note 162, 873 F.2d 650, 653 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that there was no
doubt that an expulsion order qualified as an act of state and then remanding the case for
further examination as to the conduct of the police officers).
258 FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
259 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 447 (1964) (White, J., dis-
senting) (commenting that courts routinely deny recognition of foreign laws).
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holders. Lastly, the apparent absence of a U.S. statement of position
should be noted. While the Supreme Court has refused to recognize
formally the Bernstein exception, the lower courts routinely recognize
and consider these statements as evidence of the inquiry's potential
impact.260 If the inquiry into the Port Captain's authority had posed a
significant threat to the executive's foreign policy, one would expect
that the plaintiff could have arranged for such a statement to be en-
tered into evidence.
3. Impact on the Parties
Obviously, the court's refusal .to presume the validity of the order
destroyed the plaintiff's outcome-determinative advantage. 261 Had
the court presumed the validity of the Port Captain's order, no other
issues could have been raised, and Protexa would have, for all practical
purposes, won the case. However, the inquiry placed the two litigants
on a level playing field. Because the policy dictated that coverage
would be extended only to removals compelled by law,262 justice was
served by granting a true inquiry into whether the order actually quali-
fied as legal compulsion.
The implication of the Protexa H decision is that policy holders
dealing with foreign nations will have to challenge foreign orders to
the same extent that they would challenge a U.S. official's order. Igno-
rance of the foreign law will not be excused. 263 Parties dealing with
foreign law will be held to the same degree of care as parties dealing
with U.S. law. This burden increases the likelihood that policy holders
will risk sanctions from the foreign sovereign. However, this burden is
a business risk that should be shouldered by the policy holders and not
by the insurance companies. If further protection is desired, the policy
holder should explicitly purchase it.26 4 This reluctance to presume va-
lidity will also increase the risk of a U.S. court incorrectly finding that a
foreign official's orders were invalid. However, as a quasi-factual is-
sue,265 the plaintiff only faces the same risk incurred in every factual
determination. The small potential for error against policy holders
260 See supra note 238 for excerpted text from the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES.
261 Protexa II, supra note 12, 20 F.3d 1224, 1239 (3d Cir. 1994)
262 Id. at 1226.
263 The district court in Protexa severely critiqued the manner in which Grupo Protexa's
attorney handled the situation. In particular, the court noted the counsel's reluctance to
take on the assignment, his cursory review of the order, his inexperience with the subject
matter, and his gross incompetence in translating the order's Mexican language into English.
Grupo Protexa, S.A. v. All Am. Marine Slip, 753 F. Supp. 1217, 1224-25 (D.N.J. 1990), rev'd,
954 F.2d 130 (3rd Cir. 1992).
264 See Protexa II, supra note 12, 20 F.3d at 1239 (explaining that application of the doc-
trine would expand the insurance coverage beyond what Grupo Protexa had paid for).
265 While foreign law is still reviewed on the same basis as U.S. law, the courts are author-
ized to collect evidence and entertain expert witnesses just as they do in determining ques-
tions of fact. FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
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does not warrant the guaranteed prejudice against insurance compa-
nies that would be incurred if the inquiry were denied.
C. Logical Extension of the Current Trend
Protexa H is only a logical extension of the current line of attack
on the act of state doctrine. The doctrine was initially based on the
theories of international law.2 66 But, Sabbatino fundamentally altered
the doctrine by switching its basis to the separation of powers the-
ory. 2 67 Since that time, the courts have continuously limited the doc-
trine's applicability and usefulness. Recently, these attacks have
included the pronouncements that the judicial decisions do not consti-
tute acts of state;268 the acts of an individual foreign official are not
necessarily imputable to the state;2 69 inquiry is precluded only if fu-
ture foreign policy is endangered; 270 foreign state acts which involve
extraterritorial activity "within the borders of the United States" are
not eligible for protection;27 1 and the doctrine does not protect for-
eign government actions from review unless the inquiry would ques-
tion the validity of the action.2 72 Protexa H only sets a higher standard
for the balancing test and potentially sets a precedent for disallowing
plaintiff's use of the doctrine as a sword.
In consideration of the other recent attacks, these two additional
restrictions are not surprising. The higher standard for the balancing
test shows only that the courts are willing to endure greater risks of
embarrassment to the executive branch. Absent any overriding pit-
falls, Protexa II shows that the courts are more than willing to review the
actions of low ranking government officials. Likewise, the sword/
shield distinction indicates that the courts are becoming intolerant of
strategic forum selection aimed at circumventing the truth.
At some point in the future, this line of attack will lead to the
doctrine's inevitable demise. In fact, one could argue that the doc-
trine already has no useful purpose. Currently, the political question
doctrine allows the judiciary to abstain prudentially from deciding is-
sues which could cause undue embarrassment to the executive
branch.273 This test is essentially the same as the balancing test for the
266 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416-17 (1964) (stating the
effect of the act of state doctrine on international law and policy).
267 Id. at 423.
268 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 608 (9th Cir.
1976).
269 Galu v. Swissair: Swiss Air Transp. Co., 734 F. Supp. 129, 133-34 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 923
F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1990).
270 See Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989).
271 Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. dismissed, 497 U.S.
1058 (1990).
272 W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400,
409 (1990).
273 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (stating that the political question doc-
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act of state doctrine.274 Using a separate and more narrow doctrine
just for foreign sovereign activity is superfluous and a waste of judicial
resources.
275
In addition, other doctrines also provide overlapping protection.
The act of state doctrine essentially protects only nonsovereign liti-
gants because sovereign litigants are protected to a great extent by the
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act.276 Forum non conveniens allows a
court to move a suit to a forum which would be more appropriate for
resolving the dispute.2 77 When available, this option allows the de-
fendant to present the disputed act to the tribunal most adept at decid-
ing the action's validity.. Lastly, if the validity of individual officials is
no longer to be afforded protection, the only inquiries precluded will
be those concerning the activity of state departments and legislative
bodies. This effect moves the validity inquiry closer to a pure examina-
tion of foreign law as opposed to an inquiry into the validity of a single
action.
Protexa II is a logical extension of the current attack on the act of
state doctrine. This line of attack has diminished and will continue to
diminish the usefulness of the doctrine. In consideration of the other
overlapping doctrines which afford similar protection, these continu-
ous limitations may soon leave the act of state doctrine without a rea-
son for existence.
V. Conclusion
Protexa Ilsets no ground breaking legal precedent. Its significance
lies mainly in its illustration of the inconsistencies and declining use-
fulness of the act of state doctrine. Current application of the doctrine
employs analytical steps which conflict with the doctrine's purpose.
Methods such as bootstrapping the balancing test and overly-specific
inquiries into the authority of individual officials essentially render the
doctrine useless. Furthermore, the use of a realistic perspective con-
cerning potential threats to foreign policy and the suggested sword/
trine allows the courts to abstain from deciding issues which would express a lack of respect
due other branches of govenment or which would result in multiple prouncements from
different sources).
274 See Bazyler, supra note 5, at 390 (stating that the act of state doctrine is superfluous
considering the existence of the political question doctrine). Cf. id. at 391 n.383 (stating that
the political question doctrine has been more narrowly applied).
275 One potential reason, however, for having two distinct doctrines is that the political
question doctrine can only be applied in more limited circumstances. Id. at 391. Declaring
an issue to be a political question essentially bars any review of the issue. Conversely, declar-
ing an act to be an act of state only precludes an inquiry into the validity of the act. Thus,
where the political question may be more broad, its impact is far greater.
276 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988); Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1424 (9th Cir.
1989), cert. dismissed, 497 U.S. 1058 (1990).
277 Waller, supra note 2, at 112. Typically, the plaintiff's choice of forum must be mani-
festly unjust to the defendant. Id.
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shield distinction reduce the number of foreign state acts which will
receive the deference and comity afforded by the doctrine.
Despite these discrepancies, the current treatment of the doctrine
leads to appropriate judgments. As an equitable argument, plaintiffs
should not gain access to U.S. courts and simultaneously be given abso-
lute protection against legitimate affirmative defenses. In regard to
the underlying policy, the act of state doctrine seeks to protect the
executive branch's execution of its foreign policy. For the great major-
ity of cases, judicial inquiries have little impact on the foreign govern-
ment and even less impact on the executive branch's policy. Thus,
given the court's obligation to hear cases properly presented before it,
the courts are correct in restricting the doctrine with tough limitations
and standards.
Finally, Protexa II raises the question as to whether the doctrine
has any continuing usefulness. The act of state doctrine has been se-
verely limited in the past few years. The courts are showing increasing
reluctance to apply it, and its goals are often protected by other over-
lapping doctrines.
Protexa II illustrates that the act of state doctrine's usefulness has
been significantly diminished by the recent judicial restrictions and in-
consistent analytical techniques. Fortunately, this treatment has
yielded appropriate judgments. Thus, in view of other available pro-
tection, the act of state doctrine is quickly loosing support for its exist-
ence. Soon, the courts should consider abandoning the doctrine once
and for all.
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